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R1085workers only accept new queens that
also carry the Sp haplotype. While this
remains to be investigated in the Alpine
silver ant, in both species the social
chromosome might dictate whether a
given individual will accept another
individual depending on whether it
carries the same version of the social
supergene or not. The social
chromosomes in fire ants and Alpine
silver ants demonstrate that complex
green-beard phenotypes are indeed a
biological reality, made possible by
large green-beard supergenes.
Fire ants and Alpine silver ants are
by far not the only ant species with
a polymorphic social organization.
The finding that a similar genomic
architecture underlies this
polymorphism in both cases suggests
the possibility that supergenes have
arisen many times independently
during ant evolution, and remain to be
discovered in other species with
flexible social organizations.References
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of Disturbed Self-MonitoringA new study reveals that the illusion of feeling another person close by results
from a misperception of the source and identity of sensorimotor signals of
one’s own body.Gereon R. Fink
Who are we? What makes us? These
questions fuel fundamental debates
in neuroscience. How is our self
constructed? How does our mind
relate us to the world surrounding us?
And how do we differentiate between
ourselves and others close by?
In everyday life, we seem to know
instantaneously and automatically
how we relate to the world surrounding
us; as a result, we hardly ever think
about this fundamental human
experience. Yet, knowing that we
are the same person over time, that
we are the author of our thoughts
and actions, and that we are distinct
from the environment are at the core
of the self and self-consciousness [1].
Keeping track of the congruence
between our intentions and their
sensorimotor consequences is a key
feature of these processes: it enables
us to distinguish between eventsresulting from our own actions or
produced by the environment and
acting upon us [2]. Normal
sensorimotor states are associated
with congruent motor intention and
multimodal sensory experience,
processes closely monitored to
ensure congruency. Monitoring, in
this sense, is usually implicit and
automatic, but it becomes conscious
whenever there is a mismatch between
the expected and realized
sensorimotor states.
Explicit monitoring is crucial for
the governance of our conscious
behavior, and neurophysiological as
well as functional imaging evidence
implicates the prefrontal cortex as the
key structure of this ‘perception–action
cycle’ and active monitoring [3,4].
Converging evidence for this comes
from neuropsychological data
obtained from patients with frontal
lobe lesions who demonstrate deficits
in the planning and regulation of theirbehavior [5,6]. Based on such
experimental and clinical data, as well
as computer simulations, cognitive
scientists buildmodels of how themind
works. Suchmodels can then be tested
by relating mental faculties to distinct
brain areas using neuroimaging or
electrophysiology combined with
lesion symptom inferences. From such
reasoning, disordered self-monitoring
has long been associated with one
class of symptoms often observed in
patients suffering from schizophrenia:
it has been suggested that symptoms
such as auditory hallucinations and
delusion of control may result from
a failure in the mechanisms by which
the predicted consequences of a
self-produced action are derived
from an internal forward model [7].
Consistent with this suggestion,
hallucinating schizophrenics show
deficits in tasks that require
self-monitoring [8]. A paper in this
issue of Current Biology [9] now
reports important findings suggesting
that the strange sensation that
somebody is nearby (and typically
behind) when no one is actually present
and hence cannot be seen — the
‘feeling of presence’ — is caused by
misperceiving the source and identity
of sensorimotor signals of one’s own
body.
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patients suggests that the feeling
of presence results from focal brain
interferences to three brain regions,
namely temporo-parietal, insular, and
particularly fronto-parietal cortex, and
that its origin is typically, albeit not
exclusively, epileptic [9]. On the basis
of these findings, Blanke et al. [9]
hypothesized that distorted
sensorimotor processing may underlie
feeling of presence also in healthy
subjects. Compatible with this
hypothesis, using a sensorimotor
robot, Blanke et al. [9] were able to
reliably induce a feeling of presence
in healthy subjects via the generation
of conflicting sensorimotor signals,
incompatible with physical self-touch.
The study provides insights into the
functional brain processes that
underlie the apparition of an alien
agent, an experience that shares
important aspects with positive
first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia.
In addition, the data support previous
theories about the origin of positive
schizophrenic symptoms.
‘‘Accounts of miracles appear in
many religious texts, and the
evidential testimony of such testimony
has long been debated. Where the
historicity of such accounts is
considered theologically important,
scholars have been particularly
concerned with their reliability.
Sceptics have suggested that
testimony became exaggerated over
time but the nature and extent of the
evidence has not allowed this
hypothesis to be tested empirically.’’
[10]. These opening lines of a
correspondence in Nature entitled
‘‘Unravelling the Indian rope-trick’’
exemplify the problem of assessing
allegedly extraordinary events:
testimony of such events is chronically
unreliable and empirical evidence
remains elusive. When attempting to
investigate a supposedly ‘supernatural’
phenomenon, such as the feeling of
presence, one faces the very same
problem: the feeling that people
sometimes experience of another
presence, typically behind them, is
a spooky sensation. It is associated
with non-scientific topics (and often
also ‘madness’!), and, accordingly,
rarely reported voluntarily and
investigated scientifically.
Furthermore, the paroxysmal and
fluctuating nature of the phenomenon
constitutes a key challenge when
studying its neural underpinnings.Blanke et al. [9] collected, over
more than fifteen (!) years, twelve
neurological patients who experience
the feeling of presence. Clinical data
revealed that sensorimotor deficits
were frequent, but not a prerequisite
for the feeling of presence. Combined
functional and structural neuroimaging
data, as well as electrophysiological
data (to determine the epileptogenic
region), pointed to the insular cortex,
the fronto-parietal and the
temporo-parietal cortex as key brain
areas for the feeling. This approach
mixes different pathologies and
etiologies, but given the scarcity of
neurological patients reporting feeling
of presence, the current patient sample
constitutes the largest cohort of such
patients studied in whom feeling of
presence is associated with focal brain
interference. A control group who do
not experience the feeling of presence,
but who were matched for
sensorimotor deficits, revealed that
fronto-parietal lesions were specific
for feeling of presence.
To assess the relevance of these
clinical findings for the feeling of
presence occurring in healthy subjects,
Blanke et al. [9] next devised a
master–slave robot. Based upon, but
extending, previous studies of body
illusions [11] to full-body illusions and
trunk stimulation, asynchronous
stimulation of the subjects’ back was
used to generate conflicting signals
incompatible with physical self-touch.
Standing and blindfolded subjects
moved their arms forward and thereby
moved the master device in front of
them. These movements were sent to
the slave robot, which applied a tactile
stimulus in real time to the subjects’
back.Robot-strokeswereappliedeither
synchronously or asynchronously: as
expected (andcompatiblewithprevious
work on body illusions) synchronous,
but not asynchronous, strokes resulted
in the experience of the sensation
of touching oneself (despite the
mislocalization, note that the arm was
extended forward!). In contrast, during
asynchronous stimulation, subjects
reported higher other-touch than
self-touch and feeling of presence of
someone else. The data suggest that
the illusion of feeling another person
close by is caused by misperceiving
the source and identity of sensorimotor
signals of one’s own body. Taken
together with the lesion data, findings
reveal the neural mechanisms of feeling
of presence and highlight that subtledifferences are sufficient to induce
reliably the experience of self versus
other.
The paper by Blanke et al. [9] is a
very interesting extension of the
authors’ previous work on out-of-body
experiences. It is a wonderful
demonstration of how persistence
and endurance over time can
eventually lead to an important
scientific contribution. The results
provide a mechanism for bizarre
reports that previously have been
considered to be non-explicable.
As Elliot [12] stated in 1936 (when
dismissing testimony relating to the
Indian rope-trick as the product of
unreliable evidence): ‘‘.always look
for a natural explanation of any
phenomenon, and when one is not
forthcoming, await the advent of more
knowledge, confident that a normal
and not supernormal explanation is
always forthcoming, provided we have
requisite knowledge.’’
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